\cii\postoped
October 31, 1987

NTY Oped came out today: "The Day Castro Almost Started World War III".
Notes on elements left out of piece, in cutting it; and further aspects to be discussed.

1. "Why couldn't Khrushchev just tell Kennedy that the Cubans had fired the AA, and that the SAM firing was insubordinate?"

2. "Who fired the SAM?" Evidence.

3. Whole set of Burlatsky quotes: including, camouflage; assurance by High Command that secrecy could be preserved, that K could get away with it. (B didn't believe; K wanted to believe.) "I'm certain that Castro caused it."

4. Firefight: possibilities. (and see 2 and 3). Including Mongoose.

5. Relations of superpowers to small allies: On the one hand, the US (and SU) takes great risks to avoid losing or damaging the relationship, or its "credibility." (See K fears of "losing Cuba"--K memoirs, Burlatsky--). At the same time, to avoid this, it risks the destruction of the small power itself! (Cuba, Turkey; VN--both sides!) The latter is part of a general lack of concern about the small power's interests, in a crunch: both US and SU prepared to sacrifice latter, without even consulting: though US showed more concern about informing, bringing Turks aboard (fear of reactionof other allies if Turkey was dumped; and see French reaction anyway).

CHECK: article on Turkish politics at the time; MacMillan's memoirs, on his reaction.

See my involvement in Turkish question: options; cable to Turks, Hare, Finletter; to Nitze...that night, to mirror; crying, with hsr.

6. Estimates of the probability of war: how were they reflected, how were they acted on, or not acted on. Nitze to hsr; hawks to Blight; JFK. What was their basis; what was a realistic basis.

7. What would have happened if K had not folded? If Castro had shot down recon anyway? If JFK had folded on Saturday?

8. Different article: Why did SU get in?

9. Why did Cuba allow missiles? See evolution of crisis out of Mongoose and invasion fears: i.e., a covert operation (for both SU and Cuba).

10. General tendency on US side to ignore independence of SU

satellites. (Greece; Indochina; NLF; Nicaragua/Cuba/SU; Cubans in Angola...

1) The actual reactions, e.g., of Nitze, to the revelation of the SSMs on the night of October 15, Monday, before the President had taken a position (that "they must go"): namely, that there was nothing the US could do about it! (answer to Shaknazarov's question, B and W 303, "do no one say that the SU had a right to deploy missiles to Cuba?"!

2) PSALM, and the earlier super-secrecy from Sept. 7 on.

3) urgency of invasion planning, blockade and airstrike, in early October.

4) Presidential attitude toward urgency, priority of Mongoose, and how it was expected/hoped to overthrow Castro. Latter question arises in the same way over: 34A; (e.g., under JFK); Bay of Pigs planning; contras in Nicaragua; (efforts against Khadafy? under Reagan). Answer <u>might</u> be the same in all cases:

5) Still-secret (?) provocation plans, either to provoke an enemy reaction that would justify invasion or airstrike or blockade,-- like the first, real attack on US De Soto patrol in Tonkin Gulf, or Sandinista incursions into Honduran contra camps, or DRV violations of the 1973 ceasefire (actually, provoked by US/GVN viiolatiions of the Accords)-- or plans for a fake-provocation, covered by provocative US covert pressures on the enemy (to rationalize an otherwise reckless and inexplicable enemy provocation, like an attack on Guantanamo, or the assassination of the US Ambassador in Costa Rica) (or a second attack on US destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf) (or alleged PAVN moves toward "US troops in SVN" from Cambodia, prior to Cambodian incursion)

(See Sheehan CIA informant on plans for fake attack on Guantamano before Bay of Pigs. Was this supposedly to be done without knowledge of JFK, who would be deceived and compelled to respond? Or, was JFK's failure to intervene in part because this part of plan didn't come off?)